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INTRODUCTION
Imagine this: You recently started a new small business, you managed
to acquire several million dollars, and you are now contemplating how to
best protect your assets, not only for yourself, but also for your children
and grandchildren. Or perhaps you are a doctor, a lawyer, or a businessman
and are worried about shielding your money against potential future
creditors because of the personal liability present in your profession or
trade. Twenty years ago, you would have been allowed only one option—to
place your money in an offshore self-settled trust1 in a jurisdiction like the
Cayman or Cook Islands.2
In 1997, however, the first American self-settled asset protection trust
was born in Alaska, and since then, fifteen additional states have followed
1

A self-settled asset protection trust is an irrevocable trust in which the person who creates the
trust (the settlor) is also the beneficiary of the trust. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF,
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 704 (9th ed. 2013).
2
See id. at 704–05 (discussing the recognition of asset protection trusts in several offshore
jurisdictions); see also discussion infra Section I.C. While no empirical study exists, scholars have
estimated that the value of offshore self-settled trusts currently exceeds one trillion dollars. Ritchie W.
Taylor, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: “The Estate Planning Tool of the Decade” or a Charlatan?,
13 BYU J. PUB. L. 163, 164 (1998) (stating that it was estimated more than one trillion dollars of trust
funds were in asset protection trusts in foreign jurisdictions alone).
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suit.3 You may now choose between settling in one of sixteen domestic
jurisdictions or elect to put your money in one of the many available
offshore jurisdictions.4 Intuitively, the choice appears an easy one: Why put
your money in the Cayman Islands when you can put it in South Dakota or
Alaska?5 Not only will your trust business stay in the United States, but you
can also avoid the obvious risks of transferring your money outside the
country.6 Unfortunately, what should be a simple decision has become
anything but simple as a result of the risk that courts will refuse to enforce
these new trust instruments.7
While self-settled asset protection trusts, known as domestic asset
protection trusts in the United States, had their onshore genesis in 1997, it
took over fifteen years for a domestic court to consider their
enforceability.8 The only case to speak to the enforceability of a domestic
3

DAVID G. SHAFTEL, ACTEC COMPARISON OF THE DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION TRUST
STATUTES, at I (2015), http://www.actec.org/assets/1/6/Shaftel-Comparison-of-the-Domestic-AssetProtection-Trust-Statutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/JV5U-9JJ9]. For a discussion on the current climate of
self-settled asset protection states, see Adam J. Hirsch, Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust,
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685 (2006).
4
See Matthew Russo, Comment, Asset Protection: An Analysis of Domestic and Offshore Trust
Accounts, 23 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 265, 279–91 (2014) (discussing the evolution of current law
regarding both offshore and domestic trust instruments, presenting the advantages and disadvantages of
each).
5
See Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 35 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479, 515 (2000) (noting that choosing a domestic trust over an offshore one has
the obvious benefits of avoiding the uncertainties that flow from transferring assets to a jurisdiction
with different language, political and legal structure, and currency); Darsi Newman Sirknen, Domestic
Asset Protection Trusts: What’s the Big Deal?, 8 TRANSACTIONS TENN. J. BUS. L. 133, 136 (2006)
(discussing the benefits that flow into the United States economy by choosing domestic trusts over
offshore instruments and that “the United States is unquestionably more politically and economically
stable than any of the offshore [domestic asset protection trust] host countries”).
6
See Ellen C. Auwarter, Note, Compelled Waiver of Bank Secrecy in the Cayman Islands: Solution
to International Tax Evasion or Threat to Sovereignty of Nations?, 9 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 680, 680–87
(1986) (analyzing the sovereignty and conflict of laws issues facing offshore jurisdictions); Paul M.
Roder, Note, American Asset Protection Trusts: Alaska and Delaware Move “Offshore” Trusts onto the
Mainland, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1253, 1257 (1999) (discussing the risks of transferring money to
foreign countries).
7
Historically, offshore trusts have provided much better protection than domestic asset protection
trusts. See Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and Eating It Too,
47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 56–66 (1994) (discussing the strengths of offshore trusts in places like the
Bahamas and Cook Islands in comparison with the problems presented by domestic trusts); Robert T.
Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 309–10 (2002)
(highlighting common features of an offshore asset protection trust compared with the current evolution
of domestic trust law, and concluding that myriad problems face domestic versus offshore settlors).
8
Waldron v. Huber (In re Huber), 493 B.R. 798, 807–09 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013). By this, I
mean enforceability of a trust by a settlor from a jurisdiction which does not have domestic asset
protection trust laws who places their money in trust in one of the states that does. However, it should
be noted that several courts have considered the enforceability of offshore asset protection trusts. See,
e.g., Lawrence v. Goldberg (In re Lawrence), 279 F.3d 1294, 1298–301 (11th Cir. 2002); FTC v.
Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1239–44 (9th Cir. 1999). Moreover, courts have also
considered choice of law principles in spendthrift trusts. See, e.g., Sattin v. Brooks (In re Brooks),
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asset protection trust is In re Huber, in which a Washington bankruptcy
court first addressed the broader choice of law question in a decision
involving a Washington settlor who created a self-settled trust under
Alaska law.9 The court determined that Washington law, not Alaska law,
should apply to determine the validity of the Alaskan trust.10 Applying
Washington law, the court found that the trust violated Washington’s
public policy against self-settled trusts, rendering the trust unenforceable.11
While no appellate court has yet considered this question, it is only a matter
of time before one does.
Accordingly, this Note will address the choice of law12 issues raised
when dealing with domestic asset protection trusts, but will part company
with the Huber court’s application and analysis of these choice of law
principles. More specifically, this Note will argue that Huber incorrectly
applied choice of law principles as a matter of law, as well as through the
normative law and economics perspective of jurisdictional competition.
First, this Note demonstrates that the choice of law analysis must not
overlook one of the most important tenets of trust law: trustor intent.13 In
most cases, not only does the trustor intend for the trust to be governed
under the law of the favorable jurisdiction, but the trustor also typically
includes a provision in the contract which explicitly designates a particular
jurisdiction.14 Second, this Note establishes that both Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws §§ 270 and 273 weigh heavily in favor of enforcing
domestic asset protection trusts.15 Third, this Note demonstrates that not
only was Huber incorrectly decided, but public policy actually favors the
217 B.R. 98, 101–03 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998); Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy),
201 B.R. 685, 701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
9
Huber, 493 B.R. at 807–09.
10
Id. at 808–09.
11
Id. at 809.
12
Essentially, choice of law principles ask, “Which law should apply?” When there is a difference
between multiple jurisdictions with some connection to a case, a court can either apply the law of the
forum state or the law of the site of the transaction or happening which gave rise to the litigation. In this
instance, we will consider the principles outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws since
it has consistently been the main consideration used in court decisions on the instant issue and related
issues in the offshore context. See, e.g., id. at 807; Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 697–98; Ferrari v. Barclays
Bus. Credit, Inc. (In re Morse Tool, Inc.), 108 B.R. 384, 385–88 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
13
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, ch. 10, topic 2 intro. note (AM. LAW. INST.
1971) (noting that the chief purpose of trust law is to carry out the intent of the trustor).
14
See Amy Lynn Wagenfeld, Note, Law for Sale: Alaska and Delaware Compete for the Asset
Protection Trust Market and the Wealth that Follows, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 831, 839 (1999)
(“To create this ideal trust a settlor transfers his assets into trust, names himself as a beneficiary,
includes a provision that the trust holdings may not be voluntarily or involuntarily alienated prior to
distribution, and appoints as trustee either himself or a third party over whom he retains certain
powers.” (emphasis added)).
15
See discussion infra Part III.
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legality of these trusts.16 Amongst other reasons, there are already
mechanisms in place by which individuals can legally protect assets that do
not violate public policy. For example, tenancy by the entirety17 and
homestead exemptions18 already allow individuals to legally shield their
property from creditors.19 Domestic asset protection laws merely tip the
scales back towards the beneficiaries.
Moreover, the Huber court’s misapplication of these principles within
the broader context of domestic asset protection trusts will invite
unforeseen and potentially devastating collateral damage, including a
detrimental impact on current notions of interstate federalism. Specifically,
this Note asserts that, by putting a chokehold on settlors who create
domestic asset protection trusts through the mechanism of choice of law
rules, courts ignore both the constitutional underpinnings and the economic
benefits of interstate federalism—particularly the financial importance of
interstate competition.
For all the aforementioned reasons, this Note will preemptively
debunk any suggestion that Huber should become the standard-bearer for
determining the enforceability of future domestic asset protection trusts.20
Accordingly, Part I traces the evolution of trust law, from the advent of
trusts to the development of domestic asset protection trust statutes. Part II
outlines the facts, reasoning, and holding of the only case to directly
address domestic asset protection trusts: In re Huber. Part III analyzes
Huber within the broader framework of choice of law and domestic asset
protection trusts, highlighting the logical and legal flaws in its reasoning.
Part IV argues that, as more cases like Huber arise around the country,
courts should recognize the benefits of enforcing these trusts—not look for
reasons to minimize enforceability. A brief conclusion will follow.

16

While public policy is a somewhat amorphous concept, something typically runs in concert with
public policy when it is in the interest of the state that it be performed. See discussion infra
Section IV.A.
17
This concerns only jurisdictions that allow shielding of property from the creditors of one
spouse. See Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home,
107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1100–01 (2009).
18
A homestead exemption protects a certain portion of a home’s value from tax. See id.; Anup
Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1294–97 (2008).
19
See John K. Eason, Policy, Logic, and Persuasion in the Evolving Realm of Trust Asset
Protection, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2621, 2668 (2006); Stern, supra note 17, at 1100–01.
20
As Professors Max Schanzenbach and Robert Sitkoff observe, many scholars, from several
vantage points, have argued that domestic asset protection trusts are unenforceable. Robert H. Sitkoff &
Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of
Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 384 n.88 (2005); see, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Asset
Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000). This Note
argues to the contrary.
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I.

BACKGROUND

A. Origins of Trust Law
The choice of law flaws in Huber can only be understood through the
prism of both trust law generally and the progression of the trust landscape
in the United States. Functionally, a trust is an arrangement by which
assets, whether tangible or intangible,21 are split and held by different
persons—whereby a trustee manages the assets as a fiduciary for one or
more beneficiaries.22 The trustee holds legal title to the trust property,
which in most cases means full autonomy to manage the property in trust.23
The beneficiaries hold equitable title, meaning they are authorized to
receive payments from the trust income or corpus.24
American trust law can be traced back to the thirteenth century, when
the Franciscan friars first arrived in England.25 Because the friars were not
permitted to own property, land was conveyed to other individuals and held
for the use of the friars.26 While this system thrived for several years,
laymen began taking advantage of the process in order to avoid certain
compulsory legal obligations of a property’s legal titleholder.27 By
transferring legal title to another person, but preserving the trust, persons
who broke the law or made risky investments could prevent the forfeiture
of their trust property.28
In 1535, Parliament enacted the Statute of Uses, recognizing the fact
that trusts had predominantly become “instruments of fraud” and intending
to thwart their further abuse.29 While the Statute eliminated many trust uses,
21

For example, an intangible asset might be a patent, copyright, or other form of intellectual
property. See George Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1179,
1179 (1987).
22
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 385.
23
Id.
24
Id. The corpus of a trust is the sum of money or property placed into the instrument and set aside
for beneficiaries. See John Bourdeau et al., Devise, Bequest, Inheritance, or Trust Income, 85 C.J.S.
TAXATION § 1866, Westlaw (database updated September 2016).
25
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 386.
26
M.D. LAMBERT, FRANCISCAN POVERTY 84 (1961); Avisheh Avini, Comment, The Origins of the
Modern English Trust Revisited, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1139, 1144 (1996).
27
Avini, supra note 26, at 1144. The English common law of property contained several
limitations including general restrictions on holding legal title to land and inter vivos conveyances of
property, and a complete prohibition on post mortem transfers. Id. at 1143.
28
Id. at 1144–45.
29
Id. at 1145–46. Many have argued that the object of the statute was to destroy the monasteries
and confiscate their property, and the best way to accomplish this was to abolish trusts. See GEORGE
GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 4, at 11 (5th.
ed. 1973). For the political history surrounding the Statute of Uses, see W.S. Holdsworth, The Political
Causes Which Shaped the Statute of Uses, 26 HARV. L. REV. 108 (1912).
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it spoke only to real property.30 Therefore, utilizing trusts to protect
personal property was regarded as a permissible trust use.31 These trusts,
which survived the Statute of Uses, then became the origin of modern trust
law.32
B. Trust Law Moves to America
The thirteen original states, which generally adopted the English
common law, also adopted the English structure and substance of equity
jurisprudence, which incorporated the law of trusts.33 Over time, however,
American trust law began to separate from English trust law in several
notable aspects.34 One key distinction was the importance of “dead hand”
control in American trust law.35 American trust law sought to allow more
control from the grave than did its English predecessor, where intent of the
trustor ruled.36 The spendthrift trust was one such example.37
30

See 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1535) (Eng.), in 3 STATUTES OF THE REALM 539–42 (1817).
See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 29, § 5, at 12. For example, a gift to A for five years,
intended for the use of B, was not affected by the Statute. Id.
32
See Avini, supra note 26, at 1143–47 (noting that the evolution of trusts converged with the
passage of the Statute of Uses).
33
See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 29, § 6, at 14. It should be noted, however, that the
development of equity jurisprudence was initially “slow and difficult” in the United States. Id. Still,
despite other legal deficiencies and a dearth of domestic precedent in early America, trust litigation was
relatively prevalent. Id.; see, e.g., Bacon v. Taylor, 1 Kirby 368 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1788); State ex rel.
Hindman v. Reed, 4 H. & McH. 6 (Md. Ct. Ch. 1797).
34
See Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1193–1201 (1985) (describing the evolution of and ultimately separation of
American and English trust law, with a specific description on spendthrift trusts).
35
Dead hand control is the ability to use wealth to influence certain behavior after death. See
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE
LAW 4 (2009). American law, like other modern legal systems, recognizes the right of the dying to
decide how their money will be allocated. Id. at 46. However, unlike other legal systems, American
trust jurisprudence has placed a higher level of deference on the amount of testator freedom. See
Susanna L. Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of Testamentary Freedom in
Nineteenth-Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 959, 963 (2006). To see arguments for and against
limitations on dead hand control, compare Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6,
1789) in 6 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3–4 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904) (“‘[T]hat the earth
belongs in usufruct to the living;’ that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.”), and RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 18.3, at 554–56, § 18.7, at 548 (7th ed. 2007) (arguing,
through an example, that fully embracing dead hand control would be “wholly devoid of an economic
foundation” because there must be room for some flexibility), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The controlling
consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor’s intention. The donor’s
intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.”).
36
According to Professors Dukeminier and Sitkoff, “in England and the Commonwealth . . . after a
trust becomes irrevocable, the trust property is regarded as belonging to the beneficiaries, and the dead
hand continues to rule only by sufferance of the beneficiaries.” DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1,
at 718. However, in America, it is the settlor who is seen as controlling—even from the grave. See id. at
719.
37
Id. at 719.
31
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A spendthrift trust is created for purposes of protecting the trust
corpus while allowing the trust beneficiary to receive trust income.38 As
American trust law evolved and expanded, trusts played a prominent role in
avoiding creditors.39 The spendthrift trust became immensely popular
because it was an instrument that served to do just that.40
The following hypothetical highlights the legal leap accomplished
through the development of enforceable spendthrift trusts.41 Assume a
father wants to make a gift of money to his daughter. If the gift is made in a
single payment, his daughter can go out immediately and spend that
money. If the payment is made over time, his daughter can only spend the
income as the stream of money comes in—though she could also sell her
annuity for the present value and have access to a lump sum. In both cases,
however, a creditor could easily gain access to the daughter’s sum of
money gifted by her father. By putting the money in a spendthrift trust, the
father could make a gift to his daughter while assuring both that she could
not alienate that trust interest and that no creditor could reach her interest.
Simply put, it is one of the ultimate means of protecting wealth.
In essence, a spendthrift trust is a trust that includes specific
provisions that prohibit the beneficiary from voluntarily alienating their
interest, but which also bars attachment by creditors.42 For example, a
spendthrift provision prevents the beneficiary from using the trust
instrument as collateral on a loan.43 Additionally, a creditor can only reach
the beneficiary’s trust assets once a distribution has been made.44 The

38

See id. at 694–98.
Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and
Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 438 (1998) (analyzing the functions of the law of trusts and
asserting that protecting one’s assets from creditors is one of the most significant contributions of trust
law).
40
See Alan Newman, The Rights of Creditors of Beneficiaries Under the Uniform Trust Code: An
Examination of the Compromise, 69 TENN. L. REV. 771, 772 (2002) (stating that settlors started to place
spendthrift provisions in their trusts to keep creditors of their beneficiaries from squandering their
interests).
41
This hypothetical is adopted from a similar hypothetical and explanation of spendthrift trusts. See
Michael Sjuggerud, Comment, Defeating the Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust in Bankruptcy, 28 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 977, 979 (2001).
42
Erwin N. Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts Created in Whole or in Part for the Benefit of the Settlor,
44 HARV. L. REV. 203, 203 n.1 (1930). Some state courts, however have relaxed such restraints on
voluntary alienation and have allowed attachment by creditors in some situations, such as fraudulent
conveyances. Id. at 203 & n.1, 203–04.
43
Kellsie J. Nienhuser, Comment, Developing Trust in the Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust, 15 WYO.
L. REV. 551, 555 (2015).
44
Id.
39
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creditor cannot place a lien on the trust instrument or otherwise access the
trust assets.45
Two late nineteenth-century cases contributed to the widespread
acceptance of the spendthrift trust in the United States.46 In the most
important of these cases, Nichols v. Eaton, the Supreme Court laid the
groundwork for the extensive recognition of spendthrift trusts as a legal
mechanism for protecting beneficiaries from the legitimate entitlements of
their creditors.47 In Nichols, Justice Miller argued:
Why a parent, or one who loves another, and wishes to use his own property
in securing the object of his affection, as far as property can do it, from the ills
of life, the vicissitudes of fortune, and even his own improvidence, or
incapacity for self-protection, should not be permitted to do so, is not readily
perceived.48

Justice Miller’s assertion was the first instance in which a court specifically
addressed the notion, and legality, of a spendthrift trust.49 Although many
supported Justice Miller’s viewpoint,50 the idea was not without its share of
critics,51 nor did it gain immediate traction.52 Still, the Nichols decision
proved to be the foundation of legitimacy for the concept.53 Over the next
45

Id.
See Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875); Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170
(1882).
47
91 U.S. at 725–27. Interestingly, the case itself did not concern a spendthrift trust, yet Justice
Miller saw an opportunity, in dicta, to discuss their validity. See John K. Eason, Developing the Asset
Protection Dynamic: A Legacy of Federal Concern, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 23, 39 (2002).
48
Nichols, 91 U.S. at 727. Additionally, Justice Miller emphasized the power and ownership rights
of the donor:
[T]he doctrine, that the owner of property, in the free exercise of his will in disposing of it, cannot
so dispose of it, but that the object of his bounty, who parts with nothing in return, must hold it
subject to the debts due his creditors, though that may soon deprive him of all the benefits sought
to be conferred by the testator’s affection or generosity, is one which we are not prepared to
announce as the doctrine of this court.
Id. at 725.
49
See Eason, supra note 47, at 41–42.
50
See, e.g., Nathaniel S. Brown, Spendthrift Trusts, 54 CENT. L.J. 382, 393 (1902) (asserting that
spendthrift trusts do not conflict with public policy); George P. Costigan, Jr., Those Protective Trusts
Which Are Miscalled “Spendthrift Trusts” Reexamined, 22 CALIF. L. REV., 471, 480 (1934) (arguing in
favor of a progressive attitude toward spendthrift trusts, in line with Nichols).
51
See, e.g., John Chipman Gray, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY, at iii–iv (1883)
(outlining objections to the adoption of spendthrift trust laws).
52
See Eason, supra note 47, at 41 n.73 (noting that while Nichols set the groundwork for the
spendthrift trust doctrine, the subsequent state court decision Broadway National Bank and other
dynamics ultimately were the driving force behind its acceptance).
53
Nichols continues to influence state court approaches to difficult spendthrift trust issues. See
Scott v. Bank One Tr. Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1082 (Ohio 1991) (relying on the reasoning in Nichols,
specifically Justice Miller’s freedom of disposition argument, as the rationale for why Ohio precedent
disfavoring spendthrift trusts should be rejected); see also Sligh v. First Nat’l Bank of Holmes Cty.,
46
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quarter of a century, an overwhelming majority of state legislatures and
courts eventually acknowledged the enforceability of spendthrift
provisions.54 As it stands today, spendthrift provisions have found universal
approval in all fifty states.55 As spendthrift trusts began to garner
widespread acceptance, the debate shifted to specific issues within the law
of spendthrift trusts.56 One of the most controversial of those issues became
self-settled spendthrift trusts.
C. Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts
Although the majority of jurisdictions in the United States now
recognize some form of spendthrift trust, this recognition does not
generally extend to spendthrift trusts created by and for the settlor.57 That
is, a trust is considered void if a portion of the beneficial interest is held for
the creator of the trust.58 This standard is based on the policy concern that
property owners could mislead creditors by allocating money for their own
needs before paying back creditors.59 Historically, courts saw a
philosophical divide between those property owners seeking to provide
economically for their family and property owners looking to “protect
themselves against their own profligacy, at the expense of their creditors.”60
704 So. 2d 1020, 1025–27 (Miss. 1997) (noting that Nichols laid the foundation for the strongest
arguments in favor of enforcing spendthrift trusts before ultimately rejecting enforcement based on
particular facts).
54
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 105(2)(E)
(2016); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 166.010–180 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:9–11 (West 2016); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5801.04(B) (West 2016).
55
See HELENE S. SHAPO, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 222, at 421 (3d ed. 2007) (outlining the multitude of spendthrift trust
provisions, along with their exceptions, in all fifty states). However, states have set a variety of
limitations on the enforcement of spendthrift provisions. See id.; see, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2005
(2016) (making an exception for “[a]limony or maintenance of a person whom the beneficiary is
obligated to support” and necessary services); Shelley v. Shelley, 354 P.2d 282, 288 (Or. 1960)
(holding that the application of a spendthrift clause to an ex-wife’s alimony was against the state’s
public policy).
56
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 697 (“The policy debate in contemporary times
[about spendthrift trusts] has shifted to the question of whether to make exceptions for certain classes of
creditors, such as spouses and children or tort victims.”).
57
Griswold, supra note 42, at 203.
58
See, e.g., Wenzel v. Powder, 59 A. 194, 195 (Md. 1904); State ex rel. v. Nashville Trust Co.,
190 S.W.2d 785, 790 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944). Not only did the case law prohibit self-settled trusts, but
there was statutory agreement as well. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 15304 (West 2016); N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-3.1 (McKinney 2016).
59
See Griswold, supra note 42, at 203–04.
60
Sterk, supra note 20, at 1044; see Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419, 424 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The
image of a wise and benevolent person seeking to provide for a foolish and impulsive loved one
supersedes the values which generally require that creditors be able to have access to debtors’ assets
and allows for spendthrift trusts. However, this image of benevolent paternalism is absent when the
settlor of the trust is also the beneficiary.” (citations omitted)).
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To hold otherwise, many courts reasoned, would give speculative business
owners a vehicle to mislead creditors.61 Stated another way, many creditors
reasonably rely on the settlor’s apparent income, and could be deceived
into believing in the settlor’s financial stability when, in fact, he has no
assets outside of the protected trust.62
Under this logic, courts and jurisdictions for nearly a century
concluded that the benefits of self-paternalism do not offset its costs.63
Until the 1980s, settlors searching for maximum asset protection were thus
forced to take their chances by creating a spendthrift trust in which the
beneficiary was some person other than the settlor.64
Beginning in the mid- to late-1980s, however, several offshore
jurisdictions began to recognize an innovative method65 of attracting trust
business: opening their doors to those individuals looking for asset
protection against creditors through the use of self-settled asset protection
trusts.66 These offshore jurisdictions passed legislation which provided that
judgments rendered by foreign courts were not enforceable against the selfsettled trusts, or against the settlor, trust, or beneficiaries.67 While no
reliable empirical study exists, it is estimated that one trillion dollars of
assets moved offshore after the implementation of these favorable selfsettled trust laws.68

61

See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 155–56 (6th ed. 1987).
Id.
63
See, e.g., Pitrat, 947 F.2d at 424 (stating that the benefits of spendthrift trusts created for persons
other than the settlor must be differentiated from benefits afforded the settlor in a self-settled trust);
Arizona Bank v. Morris, 435 P.2d 73, 76 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967), modified, 436 P.2d 499 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1968) (asserting that inherent fairness concerns offset potential benefits accruing to the settlor).
64
Still, two problems arise with this strategy. First, the settlor risks running afoul of a fraudulent
transfer law—which are in place in most jurisdictions—by attempting to disguise who truly receives the
beneficial interest. See, e.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT VOIDABLE TRANSACTIONS ACT § 4 (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2014). Thus, if a person engaged in business activities where claims are likely (for example,
providing legal or medical services), future creditors may have a fraudulent transfer claim. Sterk, supra
note 20, at 1047. Second, a settlor cannot circumvent the traditional self-settled spendthrift trust rule by
selecting a beneficiary who is the settlor in fact, while not in name. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 156 cmt. f (AM. LAW. INST. 1957). “If a person furnishes the consideration for the creation of
a trust, he is the settlor.” Id. § 156 cmt. f, reporter’s notes. In these situations, a creditor can still access
the trust instrument.
65
At this point, offshore jurisdictions already provided trust outlets in the form of tax havens. See
Sterk, supra note 20, at 1047–48; Douglas J. Workman, The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the
Purpose of Criminally Evading Income Taxes, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 675, 679 (1982).
66
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 704–05 (listing the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook
Islands, and many other offshore jurisdictions); see, e.g., International Trusts Act 1984 § 13C (Cook
Is.); Fraudulent Dispositions Law 1989 § 4 (Cayman Is.); Fraudulent Dispositions Act 1991 § 4 (Bah.).
67
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 704–05.
68
Taylor, supra note 2, at 164.
62
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Although these jurisdictions saw an influx of business following the
new legislation, the lingering question of the trusts’ enforceability
remained. One of the first notable cases to consider their impact in the
United States involved two media defendants that went bankrupt serving as
owners and telemarketers of certain products and were not able to return
the assured yields to their investors.69 The Federal Trade Commission filed
a lawsuit, alleging a Ponzi scheme in violation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.70 The defendants, however, had placed their money in an
offshore protection trust located in the Cook Islands, and the offshore
trustee had strict orders not to repatriate the assets if the beneficiaries were
under duress.71 When the defendants would not repatriate the assets, they
were held in contempt and taken into custody.72 After serving six months in
custody, the defendants were released and ultimately settled with the
Commission.73 While the court was not able to reach the offshore assets,
the court’s power to incarcerate did earn the plaintiffs some recompense.
Similarly, in In re Portnoy, a New York bankruptcy court faced the
question of whether self-settled assets located in offshore trusts in the
Jersey Channel Islands were property of the estate under the bankruptcy
code or excluded from the estate entirely.74 In that case, the debtor formed a
self-settled trust in the Jersey Channel Islands, declaring in the trust
instrument that Jersey law had jurisdiction over the trust.75 Engaging in a
choice of law analysis concerning the offshore and onshore jurisdictions—
in this case the Jersey Channel Islands and New York—the court stated:
Whereas under normal circumstances parties are free to designate what state’s
or nation’s law will govern their rights and duties, where another state or
nation has a dominant interest in the transaction at issue, and the designated
law offends a fundamental policy of that dominant state, the court may refuse
to apply the foreign law.76

69

FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1231, 1232.
71
Id. at 1232.
72
Id. at 1233.
73
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 712.
74
201 B.R. 685, 689 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
75
Id.
76
Id. at 699. However, at least one scholar has argued that merging international and domestic
choice of law analysis incorrectly conflates what should be a separate inquiry. See Douglas Laycock,
Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 259 (1992) (arguing that “[i]t is a serious mistake to discuss domestic and
international choice-of-law cases interchangeably” because international law is derived from different
sources and international choice of law requires more flexibility).
70
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The court determined it would not use the law of the offshore
jurisdiction simply because the settlor “incorporat[ed] a favorable choice of
law provision into a self-settled trust of which he is the primary
beneficiary.”77 Applying § 270 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws, the court went on to hold that self-settled trusts violated the public
policy of New York law and were invalid because the domestic jurisdiction
had a greater interest in the issue at hand than the foreign jurisdiction.78
Consequently, the court ultimately refused to enforce the self-settled
spendthrift provisions and allowed creditors to reach the assets.79
D. The Domestic Self-Settled Asset Protection Trust
In 1997, self-settled asset protection trusts finally made their onshore
debut in the form of an innovative Alaska statute.80 This statute allowed
settlors to create an irrevocable trust that would make distributions to a
class of beneficiaries which, unlike prior state laws, would allow
allocations to the settlor.81 Later that year, Delaware became the second
state to enact legislation allowing self-settled asset protection trusts,
affirming that it “intended to maintain [its] role as the most favored
domestic jurisdiction for the establishment of trusts.”82 Following in Alaska
and Delaware’s footsteps, fourteen additional states have passed legislation
allowing self-settled asset protection trusts.83 While each state statute
captures the essence of a self-settled trust, legislatures have taken different

77

Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 701.
Id. at 698.
79
Id. at 701. Two cases followed in the footsteps of Portnoy, using similar reasoning to arrive at
the same outcome. See Sattin v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 217 B.R. 98, 101–02 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998)
(stating that, even though Bermuda choice of law was more advantageous to the debtor, Connecticut
law must operate when there are overriding public policy implications); Goldberg v. Lawrence (In re
Lawrence), 227 B.R. 907, 912, 912 n.10 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998) (holding that though the debtor
amended the trust document to incorporate a self-settled spendthrift provision for the Republic of
Mauritius, he could not use the provision as a shield against creditors because of the public policy in the
onshore jurisdiction).
80
See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (1997). Trust attorneys in Alaska who noticed the flight of
capital to offshore jurisdictions created the first domestic asset protection trust law, thinking that by
enacting a domestic asset protection trust, they could capture at least a small slice of the self-settled
trust market. See Douglas J. Blattmachr & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, A New Direction in Estate
Planning: North to Alaska, TR. & ESTS., Sept. 1997, at 48.
81
See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (1997).
82
Synopsis of Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act, H.B. 356, 139th Gen. Assemb., 71 Del. Laws
452 (1997).
83
Although different jurisdictions have adopted slightly distinct statutes, their purpose remains the
same. For an overview of the state statutes which allowed domestic self-settled asset protection trusts as
of September 2015, see SHAFTEL, supra note 3, at I. The current states that allow these self-settled
trusts are Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at i–iv.
78
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approaches regarding the protection, burden of proof, and statute of
limitation exceptions for potentially fraudulent actions.84
Although the first domestic asset protection trust was enacted in 1997,
there has been a dearth of litigation questioning the general enforceability
of any of these statutes.85 There are several possible explanations for this.
First, it is possible, though unlikely, that there simply have not been any
potential creditors or litigants that needed to challenge the enforceability of
a self-settled asset protection trust. The second, more likely, possibility is
that most settlors who—arguably—have wrongly avoided creditors
typically either pay the money owed or settle the dispute without the cost of
lengthy litigation. Finally, it is also possible that courts have made a
concerted effort to avoid making any decisions on domestic asset
protection trust enforceability, hoping that the debate, especially pertaining
to public policy issues, would play out in state legislatures.86 Nonetheless,
regardless of the underlying reason for the lack of litigation on the issue,
until 2013, no court had explicitly determined whether a settlor’s selfsettled trust in one state will be enforceable when the settlor’s state of
residence does not have a statute allowing self-settled trusts.
E. The Conflict of Laws Issue
In essence, courts are faced with a choice of law issue, namely,
whether to enforce the law where the trust was formed or to enforce the law
of the forum state where the suit is filed.87 The body of law that

84

See id. at I.
See Howard B. Young, Recent Court Decisions Impacting Enforceability of Domestic Asset
Protection Trusts Suggest Using Hybrid Domestic Asset Protection Trust Structure, MICH. ASSET
PROTECTION LAW. BLOG (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.michiganassetprotectionlawyerblog.com/2015/03/
recent-court-decisions-impacti.html [https://perma.cc/M6NR-PNKU].
86
For example, in Dahl v. Dahl, the court did not have to reach the question of whether the
domestic asset protection trust was enforceable because it held that the trust was not a domestic asset
protection trust, but actually a revocable trust, per the actual language found in the trust instrument.
345 P.3d 566, 579–81 (Utah 2015), amended & superseded Nos. 20100683, 20111077, 2015 WL
5098249 (Aug. 27, 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 239 (2015).
87
A federal bankruptcy court will typically apply the choice of law rules of the forum jurisdiction.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). This Note will focus on the
cornerstone of choice of law rules found in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Although
there is not uniform acceptance of Second Restatement principles, outliers and nuanced state conflicts
laws exceed the scope of this Note, and the First Restatement’s principle of territorialism provides the
obvious conclusion that a state’s territory ends at its border. Cf. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law
in the American Courts in 2014: Twenty-Eighth Annual Survey, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 299 (2015)
(providing an overview of recent cases and the choice of law rules those courts employed in a variety of
states).
85
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encompasses this choice of law question is known as conflict of laws.88
While contracts typically provide choice of law provisions, competing state
interests allow courts to select one state’s law over another.89 Simply put,
conflict of laws typically dictates “when and why a law other than the
forum court’s laws should be applied.”90
The cornerstone of conflict of laws is found in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, which has shaped the conflict of laws model
in America today.91 The general policy regarding conflict of laws is
outlined in § 6 of the Second Restatement, which outlines the aspects to be
considered when making a choice of law decision:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant
policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d)
the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the
particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.92

These considerations have merged into what is commonly known as the
“center of gravity test.”93 This test guides the court in selecting the state
with the “most significant relationship” to the issue in question.94 As we
will see, and as many commentators have noted, the “virtue and . . . vice
[of this test] lie[s] in its almost infinite flexibility.”95
The Second Restatement elaborates further on the application of § 6 to
trusts. Section 270(a) states that a trust is valid when:
under the local law of the state designated by the settlor to govern the validity
of the trust, provided that this state has a substantial relation to the trust and
that the application of its law does not violate a strong public policy of the

88

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW. INST. 1971); see also NORMAN
M. ABRAMSON, SUSAN GARY, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 294, at 46 (3d ed. 2014).
89
ABRAMSON ET AL., supra note 88, § 224, at 46.
90
Id.
91
See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, & CHRISTOPHER A. WHYTOCK,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 72, at 227 (4th ed. 2013). For various cases applying the
Second Restatement, see, for example, Pounders v. Enserch E & C, Inc., 306 P.3d 9, 11–14 (Ariz.
2013); Shoen v. Shoen, 292 P.3d 1224, 1227 (Colo. App. 2012); W. Dermatology Consultants, P.C. v.
VitalWorks, Inc., 78 A.3d 167, 192–93 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 322 Conn.
541 (2016).
92
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (AM. LAW. INST. 1971).
93
ABRAMSON ET AL., supra note 88, § 224, at 49.
94
Id.
95
Id. (citing Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1047
(1987)).
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state with which, as to the matter at issue, the trust has its most significant
relationship under the principles stated in § 6.96

There are two important points to parse out from § 270(a) that will
determine the choice of law. First, this section notes that the domestic selfsettled trust state must have a “substantial relation to the trust” in order to
govern the validity of the provisions.97 The comments to § 270 explain the
definition of substantial relation as when a state:
which the settlor designated as that in which the trust is to be administered, or
that of the place of business or domicil of the trustee at the time of the creation
of the trust, or that of the location of the trust assets at that time, or that of the
domicil of the settlor, at that time, or that of the domicil of the beneficiaries.98

Essentially, there is not one outcome-determinative element, but several
factors that courts consider.
The second consideration found in § 270 is that the domestic asset
protection state’s law will be honored unless the particular issue violates a
“strong public policy” of the state with which, as to the issue at hand, the
trust has its most significant relationship.99 That is, the law of the prodomestic asset protection state will apply even if the law would violate a
strong public policy of the forum state, as long as the domestic asset
protection state has the most significant relationship under the principles
previously stated in § 6 of the Restatement (for example, needs of the
interstate and international systems, relevant policies of the forum, etc.).
Interestingly, as this Note will explore further in Part III, other than the
trustor’s domicile, the other factors in § 6 weigh in favor of honoring the
choice of law provision selected by the settlor even if doing so offends the
public policy of the non-domestic asset protection state.
In addition to the above considerations found in § 270, which the
Huber court utilized, a court should also consider another Restatement
provision: § 273. This provision addresses restraints on alienation of
beneficiary interests and provides:

96

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 1971).
Id.
98
Id. § 270 cmt. b; see also 7 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER & MARK
L. ASCHER, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 45.4.2.1, at 3234–42 (5th ed. 2010) [hereinafter SCOTT &
ASCHER] (discussing the validity of trusts, including the substantial relation language, when the law is
designated by settlor).
99
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1971); see Monrad
G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, “Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969,
1015 (1956) (noting that the rejection of foreign law on public policy grounds occurs when the law
“violate[s] the strongest moral convictions or appears profoundly unjust at the forum”).
97
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[w]hether the interest of a beneficiary of [an inter vivos] trust of movables is
assignable by him and can be reached by his creditors is determined . . . by the
local law of the state, if any, in which the settlor has manifested an intention
that the trust is to be administered, and otherwise by the local law of the state
to which the administration of the trust is most substantially related.100

While the Huber court did not consider this provision, this Note will
later argue that it is potentially the most crucial provision for a correct
choice of law analysis.
II. THE IN RE HUBER DECISION
Against the backdrop of the previous section, we now consider the
only existing case to directly address the question of how a court in one
state will handle a domestic asset protection trust created under the law of
another state: In re Huber.101 This case involved a Washington real estate
developer who formed an Alaskan domestic asset protection trust in
anticipation of potential personal liability on a business loan.102 To protect
several of the properties pledged against the loan from foreclosure, the
developer placed the vast majority of his assets—including development
projects, his home, real estate properties, and monetary assets—in the
protected trust.103
Several years later, the real estate developer and settlor of the
domestic asset protection trust declared bankruptcy.104 However, given that
he had placed many of his assets in the protected trust, his creditors filed
suit to enforce the judgment against those assets in bankruptcy.105 The
primary question106 for the Washington bankruptcy court was whether to
apply the law of Alaska—a pro-domestic asset protection law—or the law

100

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 273 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (emphasis

added).
101

493 B.R. 798 (Bankr. WD. Wash. 2013).
Id. at 802–03.
103
Id. at 805.
104
Id. at 806.
105
Id.
106
The court put forth three different rationales as to why the protections of the trust should not
succeed. Id. at 807–16. The foremost question considered in this Note is whether the trust, which was
governed by domestic asset protection law and administered there, should be void on the grounds that
non-domestic asset protection trust law should apply. For a discussion on bankruptcy-related issues
pertaining to domestic asset protection trusts, see Richard W. Nenno, Planning and Defending
Domestic Asset-Protection Trusts (ALI-CLE Course Materials, Apr. 22–27, 2012), WL ST041 ALICLE 375, 501–19. Additionally, although the court could have held narrowly and focused solely on the
fraudulent transfer issue or that much of the assets were real estate, the court instead broadly and
incorrectly employed choice of law principles. See infra Part III.
102
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of Washington, which did not have a statute allowing domestic asset
protection trusts.107
In considering the choice of law question, the court looked to § 270 of
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, focusing specifically on the
aforementioned comment b of § 270.108 The court held that the debtor’s
choice of law, Alaska, did not have a substantial relation to the trust.109 In
coming to this conclusion, the court considered three factors: (1) whether
the trustee or settlor was domiciled in the state, (2) whether the assets were
located in the state, and (3) whether the beneficiaries were domiciled in the
state.110 Conversely, the court found that Washington had a substantial
relationship to the trust because the debtor, creditors, and many of the
assets were located there.111
Next, the court indicated that Washington also had a strong public
policy against enforcing self-settled asset protection trusts.112 The court
pointed to similar decisions in the context of offshore asset protection
trusts, such as In re Portnoy, in which the court relied on public policy in
applying New York law instead of the law of the offshore jurisdiction.113
Referencing Portnoy, the court stated, “[a]s with New York, Washington
has a policy that a debtor should not be able to escape the claims of his
creditors by utilizing a spendthrift trust.”114 In this light, the court ultimately
found that Washington law applied, and therefore, the trust was not
protected from the settlor’s creditors.115
III. CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS FOR DOMESTIC
ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS
Choice of law issues have consistently presented difficult “choices,”
both for courts and for scholars. Unfortunately, the court in Huber applied
the doctrine in a manner inconsistent with existing theory and practice.
Although this Note offers a substantive critique of the Huber decision’s
choice of law analysis, the goal of this Note is not simply to assess Huber,
but more broadly to articulate the correct choice of law analysis for the next
court that faces a similar choice of law decision at the bankruptcy, district,
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
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Huber, 493 B.R. at 807.
Id. at 807–09; see supra notes 91–100 and accompanying text.
Huber, 493 B.R. at 808.
Id.
Id. at 808–809.
Id. at 809.
Id. For a discussion of In re Portnoy, see supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
Huber, 493 B.R. at 809.
Id.
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or—even more likely—appellate level. In light of this, the Huber decision
is the best mechanism with which to illustrate the correct choice of law
analysis.
A. Trustor Intent and “Substantial Relationship”
First, although the Huber court correctly considers § 270 of the
Restatement, it incorrectly glosses over one of the most important tenets of
trust law: the intent of the trustor. At least one federal court of appeals has
specified that choice of law questions should begin with “the premise that
the Restatement reflects a strong policy favoring enforcement of choice of
law provisions.”116 In addition, historically, trustor intent was always given
a high level of deference.117 As long as the trustor provided a provision
within the trust expressing the controlling choice of law, courts complied
with the will of the trustor.118 In addition, the Restatement presents a strong
statement detailing the importance of trustor intent:
The chief purpose in making decisions as to the applicable law is to carry out
the intention of the creator of the trust in the disposal of the trust property. It is
important that his intention, to the extent to which it can be ascertained,
should not be defeated, unless this is required by the policy of a state which
has such an interest in defeating his intention, as to the particular issue
involved, that its local law should be applied.119

That is, the focus of the court should be the intent of the trustor. More
specifically, courts should find ways of enforcing the intent of the trustor as
opposed to looking for avenues to thwart specific provisions provided in
the trust instrument. Furthermore, the two leading treatises on trusts
similarly adopt this de facto rebuttable presumption that trustor intent
should be granted some degree of deference, with one leading treatise
calling the intent of the settlor, as expressed in the trust instrument, the
“only important consideration.”120 Intent is not the only consideration in
determining a contentious choice of law issue. However, as more and more

116

Green v. Zukerkorn (In re Zukerkorn), 484 B.R. 182, 192 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).
See Spindle v. Shreve, 111 U.S. 542, 548 (1884); Liberty Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. New England
Inv’s Shares, 25 F.2d 493, 495 (D. Mass 1928); Shannon v. Irving Tr. Co., 9 N.E.2d 792, 794 (N.Y.
1937).
118
See WALTER W. LAND, TRUST IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 118–19 (1940).
119
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 10, topic 2, intro. note (AM. LAW. INST.
1971).
120
SCOTT & ASCHER, supra note 98, § 44.1, at 3053–54 (“In the making of a contract, the parties
necessarily have conflicting interests, whereas, in the creation of a trust, the settlor’s intention is the
only important consideration, except to the extent that public policy is to the contrary.”); see also
ABRAMSON ET AL., supra note 88, § 301, at 108.
117
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courts are faced with decisions similar to Huber, they must not overlook
this basic tenet of trust law.
While the court in Huber ignores the underlying importance of trustor
intent, the next choice of law consideration, per § 270, is whether the
settlor’s choice of law has a substantial relation to the trust.121 The
Restatement provides that a state has substantial relation to a trust if (1) it is
the state designated by the testator, (2) it is the place of business or
domicile of the trustee at the time the trust was created, (3) it is the location
of the trust assets at the time the trust was created, (4) it is the domicile of
the settlor, or (5) it is the domicile of the beneficiaries.122 As mentioned
above, as long as the trust instrument explicitly states the domestic asset
protection-friendly state law shall apply, as it did in Huber, then the first
factor establishes a substantial relationship, per the Restatement. Further,
the fact that the Restatement places trustor intent first and foremost when
listing considerations is no accident. It simply validates the importance of
trustor intent historically, as mentioned earlier, which also aligns with its
application in choice of law issues.123 Giving even further credence to this
argument is the approach of the Uniform Trust Code, which, although not
as widely utilized, applies the law selected by the testator and states that
“[t]he jurisdiction selected need not have any other connection to the
trust”124—emphasizing the overlying importance of intent within choice of
law decisions.125
Interestingly, the court in Huber—though purporting to apply the
Restatement definition of substantial relationship mentioned above—
completely disregards the actual Restatement and its comments.126 Had the
court considered, per the Restatement comments, that the trustor
121

See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1971). As the
comment to the Restatement notes, this list is not exclusive; there may be other considerations that
influence whether or not a state has a substantial relation. Id.
123
See First Nat’l Bank of Mount Dora v. Shawmut Bank of Boston, 389 N.E.2d 1002, 1008
(Mass. 1979); Rudow v. Fogel, 426 N.E.2d 155, 160 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
124
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 107 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
125
For an overview of the Uniform Trust Code application and approach to this choice of law issue
generally, see Eugene F. Scoles, Choice of Law in Trusts: Uniform Trust Code, Sections 107 and 403,
67 MO. L. REV. 213 (2002).
126
In Huber, the court cites three considerations mentioned in an earlier case: “(1) the trustee or
settlor is domiciled in the state; (2) the assets are located in the state; and (3) the beneficiaries are
domiciled in the state.” 493 B.R. 798, 808 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013) (quoting Green v. Zukerkorn (In
re Zukerkorn), 484 B.R. 182, 192 (9th Cir. B.A.P 2012)). There are two inherent problems with this
selective interpretation of the Restatement’s definition of substantial relationship. First, the comments
explicitly list four considerations and note that they are not exclusive. Second, the cited and paraphrased
list does not mention that the case cited, Zukerkorn, actually states that the intention of the creator of the
trust should be given great import. 484 B.R. at 192.
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specifically named Alaska in the actual trust instrument in addition to the
fact that the trustee and his business was located in Alaska, the court likely
would have found a substantial relationship.127 Still, the court in Huber
correctly noted that neither the trust assets nor the trust beneficiaries were
located in Alaska.128 Yet, this fact is of little consequence given that case
law consistently holds that one of, if not the most important factor when
determining if a trust has a substantial relation to a state starts with the
choice of law provision itself—not the location of the trust assets or the
trust beneficiaries.129 In this case, both the choice of law provision and the
location of the trustee and his business favored finding that Alaska had a
substantial relationship with the trust.
B. Strong Public Policy and Most Significant Relationship
Public policy, it would seem, is the default well from which all courts
drink when strict legal analysis would otherwise call for the enforcement of
a self-settled trust.130 That is, beginning with the decisions in Portnoy and
Brooks,131 courts have consistently relied on the amorphous public policy
exception found in § 270 of the Restatement to invalidate asset protection
trusts. Section 270 states that “provided that this state has a substantial
relation to the trust and that the application of its law does not violate a
strong public policy of the state with which, as to the matter at issue, the
trust has its most significant relationship.”132
One interesting aspect of the Restatement § 270 public policy
provision is that it sets up a precondition before courts even consider
whether it is violative of public policy: the public policy exception is only
considered as to the state where the trust has its most significant
relationship—a separate consideration from the previous paragraph. While
Huber completely glosses over this prerequisite,133 scholars have noted that
it is central to the choice of law decision and that the domestic asset

127

Additionally, the trust met all of the prerequisites of Alaska law: (1) be irrevocable; (2)
expressly state that Alaska law governs the validity, construction, and administration of the trust, and
(3) include a spendthrift provision. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (2015).
128
493 B.R. at 808–09.
129
See, e.g., supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text.
130
See Gideon Rothschild et al., Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts: Should a Few Bad Apples Spoil the
Bunch?, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 763, 767–77 (1999) (discussing the problems with Portnoy and
others regarding their public policy analyses).
131
For a discussion on these cases, see supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
132
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
133
Huber cites to Restatement § 270, yet moves straight to the public policy analysis without any
consideration of the actual principles or text of the Restatement—in this case the “significant
relationship” test. See 493 B.R. at 807–09.
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protection state (Alaska, in the case of Huber) has the most significant
relationship.134 The Restatement (in addition to the Uniform Trust Code)
outlines several factors courts must consider in determining the state with
the most significant relationship. A court is to consider:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant
policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d)
the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the
particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result,
and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.135

In considering the above-stated factors, one scholar noted that the
“trustor’s domicile is only one factor that warrants consideration and that
most of the other factors weigh in favor of honoring the designation of
domestic [asset protection trust] state law.”136 Thus, that scholar
acknowledged that the other factors embrace the importance of testator
intent.137 As discussed in the previous section, testator intent should be the
primary focus for any debate on determining a state’s relationship to a
trust.138 Moreover, concerns within the factors of:
certainty, predictability, and uniformity also point to finding the domestic
[asset protection] state’s relationship more significant than other states.
Although courts elsewhere may only occasionally deal with domestic [asset
protection states], and thus have limited need to address the laws governing
trust funds held by such trusts, domestic [asset protection] state trustees and
their many trustors and beneficiaries have a constant need to know which
body of law governs their rights and duties.139

If courts continue to apply this endgame approach by not finding that
the asset protection state has the most significant relationship, they
blatantly disregard the spirit of the conflict of laws factors.140 Thus, it is
evident that—at the very least—courts must not ignore this “significant
relationship” portion of Restatement § 270 because it is not as clear as the
conclusory assumptions that the Huber court would have one believe.

134

See Nenno, supra note 106, at 456–57.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
136
Nenno, supra note 106, at 458.
137
Id.; see id. at 447 (“[T]he fundamental objective of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws
is to carry out—rather than to defeat—the testator’s or trustor’s intent.”).
138
See discussion supra Section III.A.
139
Nenno, supra note 106, at 478.
140
Id.
135
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Although Huber failed to include any discussion addressing the
necessary prerequisite to using public policy to determine the state with the
most significant relationship to the trust, the court still relied heavily on the
public policy portion of the Restatement, stating “Washington State has a
strong public policy against self-settled asset protection trusts [and]
[s]pecifically, . . . transfers made to self-settled trusts are void as against
existing or future creditors.”141 The court also noted that statutory
disapproval of self-settled trusts has been in place for over a century.142
Additionally, the court cited Portnoy to convey that this holding is in
solidarity with the various other states that have found that self-settled
trusts violate public policy.143
There are several problems with the court’s public policy analysis
under Restatement § 270 that require correction. First, the court ignored the
crucial detail that it was the first to consider domestic self-settled asset
protection trusts. By contrast, Portnoy considered an offshore self-settled
trust.144 This point is made clearer, as noted by prominent Law Professor
Douglas Laycock, given the original objective motivating the “strong
public policy” language within the choice of law rules:
Traditional approaches to choice of law contain an even more offensive
variation on better-law approaches. This is the rule that the forum can reject
sister-state law on the ground that it too deeply offends the public policy of
the forum. This is the extreme case of better-law rules. Texas would reject
California law not just because Texas law is better, but because California law
is so offensive that it cannot be tolerated in a Texas court. Texas can reject the
law of Libya in this high-handed way, or even the law of Alberta, and it may
occasionally need to do so. But it cannot so treat a sister state admitted to the
Union on an equal footing with itself. The public-policy exception is a relic
carried over from international law without reflection on the changes in
interstate relations wrought by the Constitution.145

Professor Laycock outlines the importance of recognizing that this
particular exception came directly for the purpose served in decisions like
Portnoy.146 In these types of cases, when laws from foreign jurisdictions are
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493 B.R. 798, 809 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013) (citing Carroll v. Carroll, 138 P.2d 653 (Wash.

1943)).
142

Id.
Id. (citing Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685, 701 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
144
See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
145
Laycock, supra note 76, at 313 (footnotes omitted).
146
Id. (recognizing that there is an inherent difference between selecting a foreign law over a
domestic one versus simply choosing one state’s law over the other).
143
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so counter to American jurisprudence, an exception for strong public policy
should be available. Yet, in Huber, the court relied heavily on Portnoy
despite an important distinction between Portnoy and Huber: in Portnoy
the choice was between foreign law and domestic law—not domestic law
and domestic law.147 The court erroneously concluded that applying Jersey
Channels law should receive the same consideration as applying Alaska
law.148 As Professor Laycock suggests, the court is essentially trying to fit a
square peg into a round hole when it applies Portnoy to a case of domestic
law versus domestic law. Professor Laycock goes even further by outlining
a specific example of courts making outcome-driven decisions:
Unlike a federal trial judge sitting in California, Texas judges have no realistic
experience of California law on which to base a judgment that a particular
precedent is ripe for overruling. More important, Texas judges have a strong
temptation to predict that California would now adopt the Texas rule that they
consider more enlightened. This temptation may be especially strong if a
Texas citizen would benefit. Even though the ideal is for a Texas court to
decide the case as a California court would decide it, we may achieve that goal
more often with a prophylactic rule that the courts of one state cannot predict
change in the law of another state.149

Professor Laycock hits the nail on the head. This public policy
exception was not created so that one state could superimpose its state’s
laws on another state. While one state may prefer self-settled trusts, another
may not. Sixteen states currently allow self-settled trusts around the
country.150 Allowing these trusts is not a legal principle found in one outlier
state.151
Yale conflict of laws scholar Professor Lea Brilmayer sheds light on
states’ rationale for applying their own law, identifying potential political
considerations, rather than actual choice of law principles.152 Professor
Brilmayer notes that a common thread in modern conflict of laws is the
“forum[’s] preference for its own law because of the supposed duty of a
forum court to further the interests of its elected superiors.”153 However, she
continues by stating “[w]hat the state wants is irrelevant to whether it has a
147

Compare Huber, 493 B.R. at 809 (choosing between domestic and domestic law), with Portnoy,
201 B.R. at 699 (choosing between domestic and foreign law).
148
Huber, 493 B.R. at 809.
149
Laycock, supra note 76, at 314–15 (footnote omitted).
150
See SHAFTEL, supra note 3, at I.
151
If this were the case, perhaps the strong public policy exception could be utilized. However, it is
not. See id.
152
See Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Federalism, 1987 BYU L. REV. 949, 971.
153
Id.
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right to be interested.”154 In other words, according to Professor Brilmayer,
state preferences should not guide courts, but rather, courts should heed
applicable choice of law considerations.
In fact, the above argument carries even more weight in light of the
literature regarding potential choice of law issues and gay marriage.
Professor Andrew Koppelman argues, similarly to Professor Laycock, that
applying the overreaching public policy of the forum jurisdiction violates
principles of federalism by “deliberately subverting the legitimate
operation of the laws of other states” in favor of the public policy of the
forum state.155 That is, the “strong public policy” bar is a high one which
should not be used merely to apply the law that one court views as
preferable.
In light of this literature, if we assume that gay marriage must be
accepted by its sister states (i.e., it does not violate a strong public policy of
the forum state), a domestic asset protection trust should then easily pass
the public policy test.156 Unlike gay marriage, a controversial moral and
philosophical issue with extensive legal tentacles meandering into other
areas of law, domestic asset protection trusts are simply a type of selfsettled vehicle, which are already in place in most states. For example,
many states, such as Washington, already have strong public policies
favoring broad freedom in allowing people to pass their property to
others.157 Many states exempt individually funded retirement accounts and
other tax-qualified retirement setups from creditors and bankruptcy
estates.158 Moreover, many states allow instruments like life insurance,
homestead exceptions, and annuities to survive creditors’ actions even
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Id.
Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV.
921, 943 (1998). Other scholars have gone so far as to argue that the public policy exception is entirely
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997).
156
Additionally, similar to this Note’s thesis regarding the economic benefits of self-settled trusts,
many scholars have commented on the potential economic benefits of gay marriage. See, e.g., Jennifer
Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex
Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 831–33 (1995); Michael E. Solimine, Competitive Federalism and
Interstate Recognition of Marriage, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 83, 90 (1998). However, this Note argues
that the economic benefits of domestic asset protection trusts present an even stronger case. See
discussion infra Section IV.B.
157
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 6.13 (2016) (homestead exemption); id. § 6.15.020(3)
(retirement and annuity exemptions).
158
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13–54–102(s) (2016) (exemption for funds held in retirement
plans, including accounts that qualify as employee pension benefit plans under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)); cf. Employee Retiree
Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2012) (“Each pension plan shall provide that
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.”).
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though they are self-settled.159 Thus, not only does the forum state—in
Huber, Washington—not have a strong public policy reason for
disallowing asset protection trusts, but many of their laws actually favor
more testator and trust settlor freedom. In contrast, in many states, the vast
majority of citizens morally oppose gay marriage based on religious or
philosophical beliefs.160 In light of this, if we assume the literature arguing
that gay marriage should pass the strong public policy test, domestic asset
protection unequivocally should.
C. The Correct Choice of Law Analysis: § 273
While the above analysis considered § 270, the primary goal of this
Note is to point out to future courts that § 270 is not even the correct
provision courts should utilize. Interestingly, neither the court in Huber
nor, surprisingly, the defendant,161 discuss the correct Restatement
provision. That is, both the court and the defendant incorrectly considered
§ 270 when the correct analysis should have been determined under § 273.
While § 270 outlines potential questions regarding the validity of a
trust, it is § 273 which determines the efficacy of alleged restraints on
alienation.162 Both the courts and some scholars163 have confused the issue
of validity with the issue of whether or not a creditor can pierce the trust
and reach the assets.164 Section 273 states explicitly that:

159

See BUIST M. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON LIFE INSURANCE § 21.4, at 608 (1991); PETER SPERO,
ASSET PROTECTION ¶ 10.09, at 10-100 n.611 (1994); Eason, supra note 47, at 64–70.
160
See David B. Oppenheimer, Alvaro Oliveira & Aaron Blumenthal, Religiosity and Same-Sex
Marriage in the United States and Europe, 32 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 195, 196–97 (2014).
161
Defendant Donald G. Huber’s Response to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
Waldron v. Huber (In re Huber), 493 B.R. 798 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013) (No. 12–04171). Although at
least one author has noted that § 273 should apply to self-settled trusts in offshore jurisdictions, see
Rothschild et al., supra note 130, at 768–69, it is important to differentiate the application of § 273
regarding domestic self-settled trusts versus those formed offshore. While both domestic and offshore
trusts likely include a provision designating which law will govern, because offshore trusts do not have
equivalent public policy benefits as those formed domestically, courts are more likely to ignore § 273
and apply § 270 and its public policy limitation. Thus, contrary to scholars who argue against domestic
asset protection trusts, offshore trusts may carry more risk regarding this underlying public policy
exception given the inherent differences between applying offshore versus domestic law. See
supra notes 145–151 and accompanying text.
162
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 273 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
163
Some scholars present the issue as simply a § 270 question, with no consideration to the
important, if not exclusive, role § 273 plays. See, e.g., Michael A. Passananti, Domestic Asset
Protection Trusts: The Risks and Roadblocks Which May Hinder Their Effectiveness, 32 ACTEC J.
260, 267 (2006).
164
In trust law, the validity of the trust is a narrow concept, defined by the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 269. That section states that the validity of a trust addresses questions such as
whether the trust violates the rule against perpetuities. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 269 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
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[w]hether the interest of a beneficiary of a[n] [inter vivos] trust of movables is
assignable by him and can be reached by his creditors is determined . . . by the
local law of the state, if any, in which the settlor has manifested an intention
that the trust is to be administered, and otherwise by the local law of the state
to which the administration of the trust is most substantially related.165

Unlike § 270, there is no caveat for a state’s strong public policy found in
the language of § 273 or in the Restatement comments. Indeed, there are no
stipulations or additional requirements at all.166 The only considerations are
(1) the intent of the settlor, and if that is unclear, (2) which state has the
most substantial relationship to the trust.167
In the case of Huber, as previously discussed, there was an express
provision designating Alaska,168 and even if that was not the case, Alaska
still had the most substantial relationship.169 Still, at least one trust treatise
has considered whether § 273 still has an implicit public policy
stipulation.170 This raises the question of whether, even when considering
§ 273 rather than § 270, courts would simply claim that there is an
embedded public policy exception in § 273 which is fundamental to all
choice of law considerations. While this is a potential concern, given that
§ 270 does have an explicit public policy exception, it seems unlikely that
§ 273—which does not have one—was intended to have an implicit
exception. More likely, there was a specific decision made not to include
the public policy exception in § 273. Additionally, courts would still have
to grapple with the express notion in § 273 that the applicable law should
be determined by the intent of the settlor in the trust instrument, which
seems a tough hill to climb.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
While the above choice of law discussion demonstrates that
established conflict of laws principles should find domestic asset protection
trusts enforceable, two broader arguments reveal the positive implications
of allowing these trust instruments: (1) public policy and (2) the economic
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Id. § 273 (emphasis added).
Id.
167
Id.
168
Waldron v. Huber (In re Huber), 493 B.R. 798, 807 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013). Notably, most
similar trusts will likely have an express provision designating the domestic asset protection state as the
state whose laws will govern.
169
See discussion supra Section III.B.
170
See SCOTT & ASCHER, supra note 98, § 45.7.1.2, at 3350–51 (discussing the possibility of an
implicit public policy provision with § 273).
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and political theory of interstate federalism. Each will be discussed below
in turn.
A. Public Policy
In 1995, not one state allowed domestic asset protection trusts.171
Twenty years later, sixteen states—and counting—have passed legislation
allowing these trusts.172 This Note argues that, similar to the widespread
adoption of spendthrift trusts,173 more states will recognize the many public
policy benefits of allowing these domestic asset protection trust
instruments.
First, asset protection created to guard against potential future
creditors is not a new invention. In fact, there are a host of asset protection
vehicles which already provide nearly identical protection to domestic
asset protection trusts. For example, employees can place assets into
creditor-proof retirement accounts.174 Similarly, while some scholars have
argued that it is “disturbing . . . [to] allow debtors to leave their debts
unpaid and still enjoy an extravagant lifestyle,”175 other asset protection
vehicles already provide the protection which so many scholars claim is
disturbing. These vehicles include “tenancy-by-the-entirety property,
family limited partnerships, limited liability companies, homesteads, life
insurance policies, annuity contracts, and transfers to cooperative friends or
family members.”176 Nevertheless, some business owners and individuals
are not able to take advantage of these other vehicles; thus, domestic asset
protection trusts simply even the playing field.
In the same light, as mentioned in the introductory hypothetical,
domestic asset protection trusts would provide business owners with
protection from potential tort liability. In 2008, the overall price tag for tort
litigation for small business owners was $105.4 billion.177 Small businesses
were burdened, however, with 81% of the litigation costs and only 22% of
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See discussion supra Section I.C.
See SHAFTEL, supra note 3, at I. The most recent additions are Ohio in 2013 and Mississippi in
2014. Id.
173
Spendthrift trusts were once controversial, yet they have now achieved nearly widespread
acceptance in the United States. Nienhuser, supra note 43, at 554.
174
See Tenneco Inc. v. First Va. Bank of Tidewater, 698 F.2d 688, 689–90 (4th Cir. 1983).
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See Karen E. Boxx, Gray’s Ghost—A Conversation About the Onshore Trust, 85 IOWA L. REV.
1195, 1259 (2000).
176
See Passananti, supra note 163, at 262.
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U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, TORT LIABILITY COSTS FOR SMALL BUSINESS 1
(2010),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/ilr_small_business_2010_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G2AB-7L9W].
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the revenue.178 Frivolous tort lawsuits are a continual drain on small
business resources in the United States, and domestic asset protection trusts
could help solve this problem, while also making sure, through fraudulent
conveyance statutes and other means, that businesses are not cheating the
system. Not only would domestic asset protection trusts allow small
business owners to protect against these lawsuits, but presumably, these
owners would shift those assets back into the economy—producing an
additional economic benefit.179
The second public policy argument supporting domestic asset
protection trusts is the economic benefit the United States would receive—
a benefit currently enjoyed in offshore jurisdictions. In 2004, the Treasury
Department estimated that “tens of billions” of dollars of assets were held
in offshore asset protection trusts.180 Additionally, according to one
analysis, over 100,000 Americans created these offshore trusts between
1994 and 1999.181 This information demonstrates that by not allowing
domestic asset protection trusts, the United States has stimulated an exodus
of wealth to offshore jurisdictions. Alternatively, if this capital remained in
the United States via domestic asset protection trusts, the United States
economy—through attorneys, financial advisors, potential tax revenue, and
other means—would greatly benefit.182 Moreover, allowing these offshore
assets to move into similar vehicles in the United States will bring more
economically productive uses, such as reducing the litigation battles
currently fought to bring those offshore assets back to the United States.
178

Id. at 9. Additionally, small businesses paid $35.6 billion of these tort costs out of their own
pocket. Id.
179
See id. at 6 (discussing research that demonstrates the economic benefit small businesses would
otherwise provide to the economy without the fear of frivolous lawsuits); Lloyd Dixon et al., The
Impact of Regulation and Litigation on Small Businesses and Entrepreneurship: An Overview, in IN
THE NAME OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP? THE LOGIC AND EFFECTS OF SPECIAL REGULATORY TREATMENT
FOR SMALL BUSINESS 17 (Susan M. Gates & Kristin J. Leuschner eds., 2007) (noting the uphill
economic battle of small businesses who face prolonged litigation); see also discussion infra Section
IV.B.
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Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Professional Responsibility Issues Associated with Asset Protection
Trusts, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 561, 569 n.31 (2004) (citation omitted); see also David Leigh,
Billions Hidden Offshore: Jersey Faces Tax Clampdown, GUARDIAN, Sept. 26, 1998, at 1 (noting that
billions of British pounds were hidden in offshore British tax havens in 1998).
181
See William C. Symonds, Offshore Trusts: Not So Watertight, BLOOMBERG (July 25, 1999,
11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/1999-07-25/offshore-trusts-not-so-watertight
[https://perma.cc/E8HG-NWEX]. Additionally, it is estimated that tens of thousands of new offshore
trusts are created every year. See Gary P. Kaplan, Use of Offshore Trusts, ARNOLD & PORTER (Apr. 28,
2008),
http://www.arnoldporter.com/es/perspectives/publications/2008/04/use-of-offshore-trusts
[https://perma.cc/26XU-WELW].
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Further, most domestic asset protection statutes mandate that one trustee be chosen from that
particular state and that a certain percentage of the assets be managed from within the state—providing
additional incentives for state legislatures to implement these statutes and boost their economy. See
Passananti, supra note 163, at 261, 263.
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Ultimately, allowing domestic asset protection trusts provides clarity within
the legal process with regard to these instruments, where courts can limit
abuse and potential fraudulent activity because the trusts will be created
and administered within the jurisdiction of the United States.
B. Interstate Federalism
In addition to general public policy implications, courts that disregard
choice of law principles in favor of their own states’ public policy norms
ignore (1) the constitutional underpinnings and (2) economic benefits of
interstate federalism—specifically the financial importance of interstate
competition. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution sets the
boundaries on a court’s autonomy in applying the law of one state versus
another.183 The Clause reads: “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State.”184 Essentially, the laws of one state must be given equal respect by
the other forty-nine. States have different laws, but no state has inherently
better laws than the others. With regard to interstate federalism, we must
consider two related ideas: (1) whether interstate competition through
domestic asset protection trusts is in agreement with or jeopardizes notions
of interstate federalism found in the Constitution, and (2) whether interstate
competition benefits the United States economically. That is, we have both
a normative question—what should states be doing according to the
constitution—and a descriptive one—is it actually benefiting the United
States?
This analysis must begin with the Constitution itself and whether it
envisions interstate competition rather than a protectionist environment
between states. First, as mentioned above, the Full Faith and Credit Clause
states that the laws of one state must be given equal respect by the other
forty-nine—no state has fundamentally better laws than the others.185
Second, the Privileges and Immunities Clause mandates that people from
one state be treated equally to citizens from any other state,186 thus
promoting interstate movement and commerce. Third, the Commerce
Clause precludes states from implementing trade barriers and also forbids
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See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308, 312–13 (1981) (plurality opinion) (noting
that full faith and credit requires “that for a State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally
permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair”).
184
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
185
Id.
186
Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
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interstate agreements without congressional approval187—thwarting any
interstate anticompetitive practices. Finally, the Contract Clause, which
prohibits states from impairing contractual obligations,188 further facilitates
interstate competition by evening the playing field between states. The
inherent competitiveness planted in the DNA of the Constitution is
obvious: the Founders envisioned not only relations between states but
competition.
Importantly, the competitive business environment envisioned by the
Founders harmonizes with the economics of interstate competition,
particularly in the choice of law field. Enforcing contractual choice of law
provisions—like the one in Huber—fosters more efficient jurisdictional
competition between and among states. Although the roots of interstate
competition and its benefits can be traced to the economist Friedrich von
Hayek in the 1940s,189 Charles Tiebout provided the basis for modern
research in the late 1950s.190 Tiebout’s model analogized political
competition to competition in the private market by considering the
benefits provided in the form of taxes and service by competing political
jurisdictions.191 He demonstrated two related benefits, which have been
borne out in further research.192 First, interstate competition between
different jurisdictions forces elected officials to recognize the economic
and political consequences of their choices.193 Second, given that citizens’
preferences differ, interstate competition leads to an ideal combination of
goods, services, and laws across jurisdictions.194 The host of literature
expounding the benefits of interstate competition is vast.195 For example,
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Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism, in
INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 255 (1948).
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See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)
(asserting that public expenditures would be allocated more efficiently through competition between
localities).
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Id. at 419–20.
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See, e.g., Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Economics of the Local Public Sector, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 571 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein, eds. 1987).
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See, e.g., ALBERT BRETON, COMPETITIVE GOVERNMENTS (1996); ALBERT BRETON &
ANTHONY SCOTT, THE DESIGN OF FEDERATIONS 13–19 (1980); THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN
FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990); Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab,
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literature noting the benefits of this “race to the top” of competitive
federalism arose in regard to state legislatures recognizing gay marriage.196
Scholars noted the economic advantages from recognizing same-sex
marriages in light of jurisdictional competition.197 This illustrates the longterm economic benefits—regardless of the issue—of promoting a climate
of interstate competition between states.
Although interstate competition is rooted in our Constitution’s DNA,
and the normative literature establishes the economic benefits of interstate
competition, it is harder to ascertain the actual monetary benefit flowing
into the individual states and the United States generally by recognizing
domestic asset protection trusts. Here, Professors Max Schanzenbach and
Robert Sitkoff’s empirical study on jurisdictional competition and trust
assets is instructive.198
In their empirical analysis, Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff first
and foremost considered the rule against perpetuities. Unlike the domestic
asset protection trust—first enacted in 1997—several states abolished the
rule against perpetuities before 1986, giving the authors a wide time frame
to study the economic effects.199 Based on the study, they found that a
state’s abolition of the rule against perpetuities increased trust assets by
more than six billion dollars, as much as a twenty percent increase.200
Moreover, the average trust account grew by at least $200,000.201 Although
the authors noted that the benefits accruing from jurisdictional competition
were not felt in tax revenue, the findings fall in line with this Note’s
argument that jurisdictional competition positively affects states.202 In
particular, state interest groups, from lawyers to accountants to other
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professionals, benefit from an increase in trust business.203 Moreover, in
trustee commission alone—assuming standard yearly costs—trust assets
bring in more than a billion dollars a year to states.204
While Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff did not reach the same
overall conclusions regarding the number of trust assets arising from states
validating domestic asset protection trusts, they hypothesized that
“jurisdictional competition in trust law appears ready to focus next on”
domestic asset protection trusts.205 At the time of their study, only a few
states had enacted domestic asset protection trust statutes.206 Today, that
number is up to sixteen—and counting.207 Moreover, synthesizing
Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff’s article with the Treasury statistics
noting “tens of billions” of dollars currently in offshore trusts,208 this Note
hypothesizes that (1) those assets have begun to flow back into domestic
asset protection states over the last eleven years since the publication of the
Schanzenbach and Sitkoff article and (2) the benefits accruing to states
since the abolition of the rule against perpetuities has begun to similarly
accrue to domestic asset protection trust states.
The above discussion sets out the positive benefits from interstate
competition of domestic asset protection trusts. Now, the question is
whether courts will not only employ the correct choice of law analysis, but
also recognize the federalism-related repercussions and possible economic
benefits of domestic asset protection trusts. Only time will tell.
CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate that the first court to consider the application of
choice of law principles to domestic asset protection trusts badly missed the
mark. Accordingly, courts must not use Huber as a benchmark. Not only
did it incorrectly consider the Restatement choice of law principles found
in § 270 and completely ignore § 273, but if followed, its conclusory public
policy analysis would wreak havoc on other areas of the law. Allowing
forum jurisdictions to apply their own law because of political or economic
partiality sets a dangerous precedent. Moreover, the Constitution
demonstrates the Founders envisioned competition between the
203
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jurisdictions, not an environment which promotes protectionism. Similarly,
economic and public policy considerations support the choice of law
outcome. Domestic asset protection trusts already exist in alternative forms
within nearly every state around the country. Furthermore, interstate
competition is in line with the Constitution and promotes economic growth.
Consequently, the decision for future courts is an easy one. The law is
clear. The policy is clear. Domestic asset protection trusts, regardless in
which state they are settled, should be enforced.
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